





























Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Njeri, S. (2018). Somaliland; the viability of a liberal peacebuilding critique beyond state building, state formation
and hybridity. Peacebuilding. https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2018.1469341
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.




SOMALILAND; THE VIABILITY OF A LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING CRITIQUE 
BEYOND STATE BUILDING, STATE FORMATION AND HYBRIDITY 
Sarah Njeri 
King’s College London, United Kingdom 
Sarah.Njeri@KCL.ac.uk or sarahdeall2015@gmail.com 
Dr. Sarah Njeri is a Research Associate African Leadership Centre, working on an 
EPSRC Global Research Challenges Fund project: A Clear Road Ahead- Developing a 
Combined Technological and Socio-Economic Approach to Freeing Affected 
Communities from Anti-Vehicle Landmines (2017-2019).  Previously at Leeds Trinity 
University and at the John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFCAS) 
at the University of Bradford’s Peace Studies Department.   Sarah has had a long 
engagement with humanitarian disarmament, as a landmine campaigner and a 
researcher for Landmine Monitor and Landmine Action UK. Sarah tweets as @sndeall 









SOMALILAND; THE VIABILITY OF A LIBERAL PEACEBUILDING CRITIQUE 
BEYOND STATE BUILDING, STATE FORMATION AND HYBRIDITY  
Somaliland portrays the typical characteristics of a liberal peacebuilding 
context; normally a post conflict environment, which peace-builders are 
accused of defining as traumatised, dysfunctional, irrational, and 
immature, therefore legitimising models and solutions defined by 
outsiders rather than local actors.  It is also strategically located; has 
possibilities for natural resources such as oil; and has a presence of 
terrorist groups and thus is within a region that presents security 
challenges viewed through the lens of the global war on terror. 
Somaliland, also hosts numerous local and international NGOs whose 
impact on the development landscape beyond relief is questionable.  
However, there is a dearth of critical engagement or interest in 
Somaliland beyond the state building/state formation analysis and even 
then, it is comparison to the failure of state formation in Somalia.  Thus, I 
argue that outside the process of the oft cited example of state building in 
Somaliland, there is need to critically engage with other peacebuilding 
processes that are ongoing; and which have a liberal agenda. I opine that 
a critical review of such activities would offer a more nuanced and 
broader critique but most importantly, it will highlight the limitations and 
challenges of interventions in fragile contexts. 
This paper draws on evidence gathered during the author’s fieldwork in 
Somaliland in 2010 and in 2012 including some of the recent studies.  
The PhD research is an analysis of the viability of the Liberal 
Peacebuilding critique in Somaliland particularly focusing on the 
implementation of mine action. This article draws on the critical literature 
on liberal peacebuilding with the aim of challenging the current debate 
and calling for the deepening of the critique beyond the failure of state 
formation.   
Keywords: Somalia, Somaliland, Liberal Peace, Non-Recognition, 





Peacebuilding interventions have evolved from a strictly post-conflict 
undertaking, to a concept with a broader meaning and therefore broader activities. 
Tschirgi argues that the term ‘peacebuilding’ has gradually expanded to refer to 
integrated approaches to address violent conflict at different phases of the conflict 
cycle.1  This set of practices includes both short and long term interventions organised 
by both local and external actors and were rooted firmly within the UN Secretary 
General’s efforts in redefining peacebuilding through the report ‘An Agenda for Peace: 
Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping’ which proposed a strategy for 
resolving conflicts.2   
The Agenda for Peace, coincided with the ambitious UN mandate in Somalia.  
Interventions took place in intra-state conflicts even when the state at that point did not 
present a military threat to its neighbours.3   Similarly, it implicitly claimed a formulaic 
universal template, and the peace that it proposed was State-centric at heart and 
considered sovereign States to be the main actors and to which Somalia became a true 
reflection of the same.4 Thus more frequently now, peacebuilding or any analysis of 
conflict are characterized by a state-bias, and as a consequence peacebuilding is 
associated with state-building.5  Peacebuilding is therefore viewed by critics as a form 
of neo-colonial or neo-imperial control of the global South by the North/West whereby 
                                                 
1 Neclâ  Tschirgi, Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing? 
(International Peace Academy, Studies in Security and Development, 2003). Pg. 1 
2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace : Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping : Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992," 
United Nations, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html. 
3 Samuel M. Makinda, Seeking Peace from Chaos : Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia (Boulder, Colo. ; London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1993), p. 61; Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Sophie Toupin, "Peacebuilding: A Broad Review of Approaches, Policies 
and Practices,"  A discussion Paper for Peacebuild, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) 
(2011), http://eprints.bham.ac.uk/660/1/LemayHebert_PeacebuildingApproaches.pdf. 
4 Oliver P. Richmond, "A Genealogy of Peace and Conflict Theory," in Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding : Critical 
Developments and Approaches, ed. O. P. Richmond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
5 Daniela Körppen, "Space Beyond the Liberal Peacebuilding Consensus–a Systemic Perspective," in The Non-Linearity of Peace 
Processes - Theory and Practice of Systemic Conflict Transformation, ed. D. Körppen, N. Ropers, and Hans J. Gießmann 
(Opladen/Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich Verlag, 2011). 
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outsiders seek to shape the structures of these weaker societies into their own prevailing 
notions of ‘good’ or ‘civilised governance’ in what Paris refers to as mission 
civilisatrice.6   
In tandem the mainstream academic discourses on practices of conflict 
management overtly moved away from peace and reconciliation towards governance 
and state-building mirroring donor and research funding agendas in a move that was 
substantial and systematic. This is partly attributed to the post 9/11 era which brought in 
a new dimension of state security, conceptualization of peace and its implementation. It 
also led to the focus on ‘failed states’ or ‘states in situations of fragility’ creating a 
strong interest in the debates on ‘state building’, as an over-arching concept. This 
analysis further associated peacebuilding with state building conflating the two.7 
Balthasar attributes the conflation of peacebuilding and state building to the 
establishment of the Peacebuilding Architecture at the 2005 World Summit and the first 
forum for political dialogue that aimed at bringing together countries affected by 
conflict and fragility, development partners, and civil society.8   Thus the preferred 
international interventions were increasingly about the attempts to establish liberal-
democratic orders to address the root causes of conflicts and this had limited success.  
Conversely, the emerging dominant critiques of such inventions focused on 
‘states’ and their failure to succeed in rebuilding states.  This meant that inevitably, the 
critics also limited their interrogation to contexts such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, 
Somalia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Iraq,9 which had heavily militarised peacebuilding 
                                                 
6 "International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’," Review of International Studies 28, no. 04 (2002). 
7 Edward Newman, "“Liberal” Peacebuilding Debates," in New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, 
Roland Paris, and Oliver P Richmond (2009). 
8 Dominik Balthasar, "‘Peace-Building as State-Building’? Rethinking Liberal Interventionism in Contexts of Emerging States," 
Conflict, Security & Development 17, no. 6 (2017). 
9 Roland Paris, At War's End : Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).; Oliver P. 
Richmond and Jason Franks, "Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia," Security Dialogue 38, no. 1 (2007).; Jonathan 
Goodhand and Mark Sedra, "Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and Transition in Afghanistan: An 
Introduction," Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (2013); Michael Pugh, "Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and 
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interventions were recognised states largely excluding other peacebuilding interventions 
and marginal contexts.  These critiques therefore couldn’t apply to all post-conflict 
settings.10   Thus, the critics and their critiques are ‘state-centric’ tend to base their 
analysis on democratisation and therefore such offer a generalised analysis of failure.  
Such a restricted approach ignores other post-conflict contexts and types of 
interventions.  Somaliland is a politically unrecognised state, not endowed with natural 
resources but rather growing evidence for the potential oil and gas,11 has had 
interventions broadly bearing the hallmarks which the liberal peacebuilding critiques 
are based. However, unlike other contexts, it has managed to secure relative peace and 
stability for over 25 years after its reassertion of sovereignty without external support; 
whilst this successful process in establishing a viable state has generated a lot of 
scholarly12 interest including special editions of journals,13 there has been a limited 
critical analysis of other interventions taking place in Somaliland.  When critical 
scholars have engaged with the same, this is framed within an analysis of the failure of 
                                                 
Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace," Global Governance 8, no. 4 (2002). Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is 
Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 
International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009); Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Walton, "The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding? 
International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 3 (2009). 
10 Chandra Lekha Sriram, "Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of Transitional Justice," Global Society 21, no. 4 
(2007). Makes the same assertions. 
11 Jakob Grandjean Bamberger and Kristian Skovsted, "Concessions and Conflicts: Mapping Oil Exploration in Somalia and 
Ethiopia,"  (2016); Ken Menkhaus, "Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland,"  SSRN (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2589109. 
12 See the following as an illustration that state building remains the prevailing narrative that is mostly cited on Somaliland ;Iqbal 
Jhazbhay, "Somaliland: Post-War Nation-Building and International Relations, 1991-2006" (PhD, University of the 
Witwatersrand, 2007); "Somaliland's Post-War Reconstruction: Rubble to Rebuilding," International Journal of African 
Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity 3, no. 1 (2008).;  Daniel Forti, "A Pocket of Stability: 
Understanding Somaliland,"  ACCORD Occasional Papers, no. issue 2 (2011), 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op_2011_2.pdf. Iqbal Jhazbhay, "Africa's Best Kept Secret; a Challenge to the 
International Community?: Somaliland: Essay," African Security Review 12, no. 4 (2003); Marleen Renders and Ulf Terlinden, 
"Negotiating Statehood in a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland," Development and Change 41, no. 4 (2010); 
Dominik Balthasar, "State-Making in Somalia and Somaliland" (London School of Economics, 2012); Steve Kibble and 
Michael Walls, "'Tradition and Modernity in Somaliland Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State'," in Democratisation 
in Africa Conference (Leeds University Centre for  African Studies (LUCAS)2009); Micheal Walls and Steve Kibble, "Beyond 
Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland," Africa Spectrum 45 no. 1 (2010). Markus Virgil Hoehne, 
"Limits of Hybrid Political Orders: The Case of Somaliland," Journal of Eastern African Studies 7, no. 2 (2013). Rebecca 
Richards, "Bringing the Outside In: Somaliland, Statebuilding and Dual Hybridity," Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 
9, no. 1 (2015). Debora Valentina Malito, "Neutral in Favour of Whom? The Un Intervention in Somalia and the Somaliland 
Peace Process," International Peacekeeping 24, no. 2 (2017). 
13 See for example the Journal of Eastern African Studies, Special Issue Volume 7, 2013 Issue 2: Effects of 'statelessness': dynamics 
of Somali politics, economy and society since 1991 articles by Hoehne, "Limits of Hybrid Political Orders: The Case of 
Somaliland." Dominik Balthasar, "Somaliland's Best Kept Secret: Shrewd Politics and War Projects as Means of State-
Making," ibid.; Nicole Stremlau, "Hostages of Peace: The Politics of Radio Liberalization in Somaliland," ibid.  Also Malito, 
"Neutral in Favour of Whom? The Un Intervention in Somalia and the Somaliland Peace Process." 
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liberal peacebuilding agenda viz a viz Somalia and even then, Somaliland is marginally 
mentioned within the discourse  of hybridity.14 I posit this is a result of a state centric 
approach to peacebuilding and therefore a generalised conclusion that liberal 
peacebuilding that is normally implemented by external actors has failed.  Thus, an 
analysis of Somaliland, a non-recognised polity, relatively peaceful, and whose post 
conflict peacebuilding agenda was devoid of external actors is hardly scrutinised 
beyond a limited analysis of the hybrid political order.  I further argue that the formative 
statebuilding period that was devoid of external actors has masked any enquiry or 
analysis into the role of external aid/actors in other areas of peacebuilding.  Thus, the 
aim of this article is to reassert the importance of an analysis of Somaliland beyond the 
romanticised hybrid political order by demonstrating that there are opportunities to 
extend and deepen the prevailing liberal peacebuilding critiques. By presenting the case 
study of Somaliland, I postulate that there are salient context related challenges such as 
political non-recognition that contributes to entrenching the prevailing liberal 
peacebuilding critiques.   
Using critical literature on liberal peace, this paper will draw on interview data 
and observations from the field work undertaken as part of my PhD project between 
2010 and 2012. The participants were mainly purposively selected based on their 
mandates in relation to post conflict peacebuilding. These were those who interacted 
with the Mine Action Sector in Somaliland within the field of peace and conflict 
broadly defined. Thus, whilst some of the evidence relates specifically to this research 
period and in cognisant to the fact that contexts are not static, I have endeavoured to 
draw on later scholarly and institutional work from recent periods.   
                                                 
14 Volker Boege et al., "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’,"  (2008). 
Karl Sandstrom, "Cooptation, Acceptance and Resistance in the Somali ‘Everyday’," in Hybrid Forms of Peace, ed. Oliver 
Richmond and Audra  Mitchell (Springer, 2012). 
7 
 
A ‘fragile post conflict context’ 
Somaliland fits post conflict context, which peace-builders are accused of 
defining as traumatised, dysfunctional, irrational, and immature, therefore legitimising 
models and solutions defined by outsiders rather than local actors.15  Following its 
unilateral declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland inherited some challenges 
which are the legacy of the Cold and civil the wars.   This was followed internal 
problems marked by episodes of large-scale violence.16  This included total destruction 
of Hargeisa, killing more than 50,000 people at the time.17  The government bombarded 
the region with artillery and aerial shelling reducing the region to rubble and leaving 
thousands of unexploded ordnance and dwellings and water points extensively mined.18  
Populations were displaced both internally and across the border in Ethiopia.19   At the 
end of the civil strife, the society became militarised not just in terms of the size of its 
military and the influx of the weapons into the streets, but also because of the tendency 
to which intergroup relations and conflict were defined in narrow military terms.20 
Today, Somaliland still faces enormous challenges including but not limited to 
governance and its institutions as these are primarily based on improving inter-clan 
harmony and mutual trust. Clan character continually permeates politics with many 
cabinet members owing their posts more to the need for perceived clan equilibrium in 
government than to their qualifications or political relevance. In every Presidential 
                                                 
15 Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, "Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International Pathologisation of Cambodia and the 
Post-Yugoslav States," Third World Quarterly 26, no. 6 (2005). Citing Kevin M Cahill, Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping 
Wars before They Start (Routledge, 2013).; Paris, "International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice’."; Mark 
Duffield, "Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid," Disasters 25, no. 4 (2001). 
16 Mark Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland, African Issues (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), p. 115. 
17 (Gundel, 2002: p 257).   
18 ICG, "Somaliland: Democratization and Its Discontent,"  ICG Africa Report No. 66 (2003), 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/somalia/Somaliland%20Democratisation%20and%20Its%20Discontents.ashx. 
19 Joel Frushone, "Welcome Home to Nothing: Refugees Repatriate to a Forgotten Somaliland " (Washington DC: U.S. Committee 
for Refugees, , 2001). pp 15Quote at p 257 
20 K. D. Bush, "Somalia: When Two Anarchies Meet " in Canada and Missions for Peace Lessons from Nicaragua, Cambodia, and 
Somalia, ed. Gregory Wirick and Robert Miller (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre 1998). 
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appointment a clan balance is the overriding factor including the seat allocations in both 
houses of parliament.21   
Somaliland is however, short of being a classic context associated with liberal 
peacebuilding interventions; critics have noted that peacebuilding operations and 
interventions take place in countries rich in natural resources, with a geopolitical or 
geostrategic importance.22  Somaliland is not endowed with resources such as oil or 
minerals.  However, geologists have speculated about the possibility of oil in the region 
for a long time;23  prior to the collapse of the Somali State in December of 1990, a study 
funded by the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
indicated the oil potential24 of the North of Somalia (present day Somaliland).25 Whilst 
previously Somaliland’s hydrocarbon sector remained vastly underexplored recent 
studies have indicate interest has increased and foreign companies are now actively in 
the  exploration.26 Previously others had argued that the US military intervention in 
Somalia was partly driven by this. 27  Similarly, the geography of the region especially 
Somaliland, at the mouth of the Red Sea, favours oil exports.  Even the deepest part of 
the country is only a few hundred kilometres from a coastline that sits along one of the 
                                                 
21 Timothy Othieno, "A New Donor Approach to Fragile Societies: The Case  of Somaliland,"  ODI Opinions No. 103 (2003), 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1903.pdf. 
22 Zenonas Tziarras, "Liberal Peace and Peace-Building: Another Critique "  The Globalised World Post Research Paper, (2012). 
23 M Kielmas, "Oil Hopes Hinge on North Somalia," Petroleum economist 58, no. 10 (1991). 
24 Several concessions, nearly two-thirds of Somalia, were allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and 
Phillips and at least three key wells were scheduled to be drilled in the final years before Siyyad Barre was overthrown and 
the nation plunged into chaos in January 1991.  Similarly, according to Soma Oil, every potential hydrocarbon basin across 
East Africa is the subject of intensive interest and Somalia is at present the last remaining frontier on the 
region’s energy map.  Industry experts consider it to have huge prospective resources, both onshore and offshore.   Soma Oil 
and Gas Exploration Company is based in the UK and its executive director is the former leader of the Conservative Party in 
Britain, Lord Michael Howard has been Chairman of Soma Oil and Gas since May 2013.  According to its website, Soma 
Oil & Gas will be the first exploration company in the 21st Century to commence activity across Somalia in consultation 
with the Federal Government, starting with seismic surveying to establish the full extent of the country’s oil and gas 
potential.  
25 See for example; Jamil A. Mubarak, "The “Hidden Hand” Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia," World 
Development 25, no. 12 (1997); Afyare Abdi Elmi, "Understanding the Somalia Conflagration. Identity," Political Islam and 
Peacebuilding, New York  (2010); Kielmas, "Oil Hopes Hinge on North Somalia."; OL Slind, SR DuToit, and AG Kidston, 
"The Hydrocarbon Potential of the East Africa Continental Margin,"  (1998). 
26 These include UK-based Ophir Energy, and AngloTurkish Genel Energy; others such as Ophir Energy and UAE-based Ras Al 
Khaimah Gas Company (RAK Gas) cited by Dominik Balthasar, "Oil in Somalia; Adding Fuel to the Fire?," (Mogadishu: 
Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, 2014). Pg. 3 
27 For example Sydney U Barnes, "Geology and Oil Prospects of Somalia, East Africa," AAPG Bulletin 60, no. 3 (1976). 
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world’s busiest shipping routes.28   Whilst natural resources haven’t been the driver for 
interventions as has been the case in other contexts, hydrocarbon licensing and 
exploration have gained considerable attention as a driver for conflict for Somaliland as 
government concessions for oil exploration in the East has raising tensions that have led 
to temporary suspension of exploration.29  
As a region, the Horn’s strategic importance has previously attracted outside 
interest, leading to international interventions often resulting in dire consequences for 
the stability, security and development of the whole region.  The region is host to a 
complex nexus of challenges that lead to warfare and humanitarian catastrophe, has 
large ‘ungoverned spaces30, with weak and or failed states and hence is a target for 
illicit transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups.31 This means 
that post 9/11 the region became an important battle ground in the framework of the so-
called war on terror, driven principally by factors related to the collapse of the Somali 
state; the emergence of terrorist groups;  and escalation of piracy off the Somali coast.32   
Whilst Somaliland remains relatively stable, one critical feature relates to the presence 
and the proliferation of armed groups like the Al Shabaab  which possesses a network 
throughout Somaliland and whose visibility included suicide bombings in Hargeisa in 
October 2008.33 There is further concern that with that oil exploration or extraction Al 
                                                 
28 The Horn of Africa region has recently seen some major oil and gas discoveries in the world in recent years.  According to  
Deloitte & Touché, "The Deloitte Guide to Oil and Gas in East Africa 'Where Potential Lies'," (Dar es Salaam2013). 
advisory, onshore oil discoveries in Uganda have been followed by discoveries in Kenya with world-class discoveries of gas 
in Tanzania and Mozambique 
29 Menkhaus, "Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland". 
30 "Terrorist Activities in Ungoverned Spaces: Evidence and Observations from the Horn of Africa" (paper presented at the 
Brenthurst Foundation’s ‘Southern Africa and International Terrorism’workshop. Tswalu, South Africa, 2007). defines 
“Ungoverned spaces” as a term meant to connote a general condition of weak to non-existent state authority in a defined 
geographic area (p:2).  According to the ‘Report of the Commission on Weak States and US National Security’, illicit 
transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, target weak and failed states for their activities,”  
31 S Eizenstat, John E Porter, and J Weinstein, "On the Brink: Weak States and Us National Security," Washington, DC: Center for 
Global Development  (2004). 
32 See Redie Bereketeab, "The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security,"  (2013); Malinda Smith, ed. 
Securing Africa: Post-9/11 Discourses on Terrorism (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2010). 
33 Menkhaus, "Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland"; "Stabilisation and Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: 
The Somali Case," Disasters 34 (2010). 
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Shabaab targets in Somaliland might increase.34   However, concerns over terrorism has 
had no significant a role in Somaliland as much as it has in the rest of Somalia, whilst 
piracy networks and therefore an international response has remained constrained in 
Puntland.. 
Towards a hybrid political order; ‘an internally led process of State 
building’35  
Following the collapse of the Somalia state and its degeneration into a classic 
example of a ‘failed State’, Somaliland went through a process of state rebuilding which 
saw the northern clans commence an internally driven process towards reconciliation as 
a means to state building.  This culminated in Somaliland developing a hybrid system of 
government that incorporated an elected president and lower house of parliament with 
an upper house that consists of traditional clan elders known as the guurti.36  The robust 
role of clan elders in managing conflict, applying customary law, and negotiating 
political disputes which is widely viewed as a key ingredient in Somaliland’s success.37 
Thus,   Somaliland has become the prime example that liberal democratic statebuilding 
is not the only way to generate social order and has become a prime example a bottom 
up hybrid form of peacebuilding38; which the critics have offered as an alternative 
approach for peacebuilders.39  Throughout its formative period, external support in form 
                                                 
34 Balthasar, "Oil in Somalia; Adding Fuel to the Fire?." Pg.79 
35 Taken here to be the formative period is roughly its first decade, 1991–2001as defined by among others; Sarah G Phillips, "When 
Less Was More: External Assistance and the Political Settlement in Somaliland," International Affairs 92, no. 3 (2016).  
36 Walls and Kibble, "Beyond Polarity: Negotiating a Hybrid State in Somaliland." pp 5; describe a guurti, as any individual or 
group who assumes a mediatory role. They argue that this term has more recently been institutionalised and, many would 
argue, politicised in the Somaliland context through its application to the upper house of the Parliament.  The etymology of 
the term refers to the necessary wisdom of any person or group responsible for mediating disputes and can be applied to 
individuals or groups at various levels (op cit, pg 8) 
37 Ken Menkhaus, "Bcpr Strategic Review - Somalia," in Small Arms Survey, ed. Ryan Nichols (UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict 
Prevention and Recovery (BCRP) 2006). 
38 Volker Boege et al., "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What Is Failing - States in the Global South or Research and 
Politics in the West?," Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation Dialogue Series 8 (2009), http://www.berghof-
handbook.net/documents/publications/dialogue8_boegeetal_lead.pdf.; see  Renders and Terlinden, "Negotiating Statehood in 
a Hybrid Political Order: The Case of Somaliland." 
39 See for example Oliver P. Richmond, "Resistance and the Post-Liberal Peace," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 38, 
no. 3 (2010); Michael C. Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner, Whose Peace? : Critical Perspectives on the Political 
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of foreign aid was insignificant thus any belligerents’ access to external revenue from 
external actors  attempting to end its civil wars was limited.  Similarly, the process did 
not have to adhere to any deadlines such as those associated with liberal peacebuilding 
processes such as in the case of Somalia.40 
The bottom up hybrid peace that emerged in Somaliland consisted of the fusion 
of local structures, practices, values and identities that were a result of an ‘inclusive’ 
participatory process which supports  MacGinty’s  alternative conception of 
peacebuilding as one that explores indigenous approaches to conflict resolution and 
localised responses to conflict.41  However as mentioned elsewhere 
Somalilands‘bottom-up’ ‘hybrid’ approach42  was without external interveners.  This  
process however became the subject of many academic enquiries43  including  emerging 
critical voices challenging the ‘romanisation’ of this notion of hybridity noting that the 
‘effectiveness and legitimacy of both ‘modern' and ‘traditional' actors have been 
undermined by their cohabitation’. 44  The process demonstrated the intention to 
‘stabilise’ itself towards democracy with local participation and today positions itself by 
                                                 
Economy of Peacebuilding, New Security Challenges (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Boege et al., "On Hybrid 
Political Orders and Emerging States: What Is Failing - States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?". 
40 Sarah Phillips, "Political Settlements and State Formation - the Case of Somaliland. ,"  Research Paper 23 (2013), 
file:///C:/Users/snjeri/Downloads/Political%20Settlements%20and%20State%20Formation%20-
%20the%20Case%20of%20Somaliland.pdf. 
41 "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-up Peace," Security Dialogue 41, no. 4 (2010); "Indigenous Peace-
Making Versus the Liberal Peace," Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 2 (2008). 
42 O. P. Richmond, "Beyond Liberal Peace? Responses to "Backsliding"  " in New Perspectives in Liberal Peace, ed. Edward Newman, 
Roland Paris, and Oliver P Richmond (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009); Roger Mac Ginty, International 
Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Niels Nagelhus Schia and John 
Karlsrud, "‘Where the Rubber Meets the Road’: Friction Sites and Local-Level Peacebuilding in Haiti, Liberia and South 
Sudan," International Peacekeeping 20, no. 2 (2013). 
43 Bradbury, Becoming Somaliland; Michael J Walls, "State Formation in Somaliland: Bringing Deliberation to Institutionalism" (PhD 
Thesis, UCL (University College London), 2011); Michael Walls and Hodan Elmi, "Indigenous Forms and External 
Interventions in a Somali Context," REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS OF SOMALILAND’S  (2012); Marleen Renders, Consider 
Somaliland: State-Building with Traditional Leaders and Institutions (Brill, 2012); Balthasar, "State-Making in Somalia and 
Somaliland."; Mohammed Hassan Ibrahim and Ulf Terlinden, "Somaliland ‘Home Grown’ Peacemaking and Political 
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international norms of liberal democratic statehood with the intended outcome being 
international recognition.45  
Whilst progress has been made, Somaliland has remained an unrecognised State 
and therefore endures blanket references of ‘State failure’ whilst being acknowledged as 
a region of Somalia that is an ‘Oasis of peace’46, a ‘pocket of stability’47,  ‘an oasis of 
security, reconciliation, and cooperation’ or a ‘pocket of peace’ in the midst of chaos.48 
Somaliland's failure to win international recognition therefore has resulted to 
international isolation which has had both positive and negative implications; The  
isolation meant that any belligerents lacked access to external revenues and therefore 
this contributed to the ability of Somaliland to contain and manage violence thereby 
allowing locally-driven solutions and institutions to emerge and peace to prevail.49 
Peacebuilding critics have long argued that external aid can have a political impact and 
can help decide whether peace endures or war resumes.50   The importance of this 
cannot be disputed as this isolation contributed to the consolidation of peace during the 
most pertinent period however; however as I will demonstrate in the next section, the 
lack of external support was limited to the process of state formation.  
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from Somaliland," in Working paper 198 (Washington, DC: Centre for Global Development, 2010). 
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Debunking the myth on ‘lack of external support’ 
It is important to credit the resilience of the Somaliland people who initiated and 
supported various reconstruction programmes within their communities before other 
external actors became engaged.  Whilst Somaliland received no external support 
during the formative state building a myth has persisted that her lack of  international 
recognition means that it does not receive any external aid from donors and claims have 
been made that “Somaliland has never been eligible for foreign assistance,”51 or that it 
receives “little outside assistance”.52 This is misleading; what it means is that 
Somaliland cannot enter into bilateral agreements with donors.  Thus, whilst Somaliland 
does not receive official development assistance (ODA), or is ineligible for loans from 
bodies such as the IMF; it does receive some foreign assistance.53  Similarly, whilst the 
statebuilding efforts were truly internally led, external actors such as donors, the UN 
and international NGOs, the government contributed towards the restoration of basic 
services throughout much of Somaliland and their engagement remains. Today 
Somaliland’s development is slow, and the fragile peace is continually being 
challenged, the reconstruction, including the continuing of democratic reforms is 
dependent on external support. 54   
Donor such as the DFiD, the EU, Danida engage with Somaliland by providing 
institutional support for capacity-building for ministries and local administrations 
however, due to Somaliland’s political non-recognition, direct funding from donors can 
only be implemented through a partnership with the UN Development Programme 
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(UNDP). Whilst, this support may not come laden with conditional ties which has the 
potential of leaving recipients heavily indebted.  The support is largely for the very 
programs that have been critiqued for undermining locally driven approaches, and due 
to this funding model is problematic and undermines the governments development 
plans.55 
The view of Somaliland’s government is that this aid is donor-driven, 
bureaucratic, and unpredictable doing little to support the emergence of a Somaliland 
state that is able to implement its own development agenda.56  In a report, on aid 
effectiveness the Somaliland government further cited the lack by donors to involve 
them in fund raising; aid target shortage, and the irrelevant sectoral allocation’ that 
collectively undermines their development plans.57  More recently the government has 
argued that recent drought has been made worse by bureaucracy within the UN in 
administering aid arguing that the lack of direct access to bilateral aid has hindered 
them from developing a more resilient economy that is less dependent on livestock.58 
Another source of Somaliland’s external support is through humanitarian aid 
that is provided and evident through the presence of International organisations 
including 21 UN agencies, funds, programmes and organizations.59  Whilst accurate 
figures remain elusive, previous estimates of registered local and international NGOs 
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has been as high as 30060 whilst others cite more conservative estimates of 100.61  This 
has previously been estimated to have a  budget of over US $100 million, levels which 
at the time were estimated to double the national budget.62  Evidence suggests that this 
is increasing gradually, for example, whilst donor contribution towards local council 
elections in 2002 was estimated at US$750,000 this increased to nearly US$9M in 
2012.63  
 ‘A pocket of peace’ or a ‘State’; Examining the pathologies of external 
peacebuilding through the lens of political non-recognition 
Any international engagement however, operates in the de jure constraints of 
having the obligation to treat Somaliland as part of Somalia, a radically different 
context.64 Similarly, the international organisations whilst they hold purse strings and 
control programs and disbursement processes they do so guided by the principals of 
neutrality. 65  Thus for operations and donor programming purposes, there are three 
government counterparts in Somalia: Puntland, Somaliland and South Central.66   
External international actors as custodians of liberal peacebuilding 
As with other post conflict contexts, peacebuilding initiatives have been 
institutionalised in the work of the UN, international agencies, NGOs, and the many 
actors engaged in conflict and post conflict environments.  The lack of international 
recognition and therefore the model of implementation means that the role of external 
actors in peacebuilding has further been consolidated in Somaliland. For example, 
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DFID engages with multiple agencies as implementing partners via remote 
management. These include UN agencies international NGOs, local NGOS and mixed 
agency consortiums.67 
Similarly, these organisations also prefer an indirect method of implementation 
and therefore intervenes through established circles of international NGOs (INGOs) or 
large Civil Society Organisation (CSOs).  This has two implications; it has led to the 
explosion of a myriad of humanitarian aid agencies and civil society organisations 
offering a broad spectrum of services across multiple fields; and secondly it has created 
a pattern of mutual dependency as the INGOs also rely on local smaller organisations.  
It also increases overdependence by local NGOs on short-term project-based funding 
from the International organisations hindering investments towards coherent and 
effective capacity building.68 Without access to direct sustainable funding, these mainly 
indigenous organisations therefore scale up and down according to the needs and 
funding of their international partners, have varying and sometimes competing 
agendas.69 Similarly, by virtue of their depth and breadth, co-operation, collaboration or 
coordination becomes all the more challenging resulting to a ‘flag-waving syndrome’ 
with multiplicity of players on the ground making close.70 Such interventions therefore 
rest upon a problematic relationship between external and local actors, and in some 
cases reflect what Barnett & Finnemore have called institutional ‘pathologies’ of 
international organisations and risk weakening the fragile polity.71       
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Remote management and the failure to build capacity 
Somaliland remains relatively peaceful as some of the immediate post war 
programmes included the successful absorption of militiamen into the Somaliland army 
the result of this was ‘better levels of public order and security in northern Somalia than 
almost anywhere in the Horn of Africa’.72   This level of security has remained 
relatively high thanks to the robust application of customary law and blood 
compensation, administered by clan elders. However, a number of factors have 
informed the posture taken by the international actors in Somaliland; this includes 
adhering to the approaches to security (partly linked attacks on UN headquarters in Iraq 
in 2003) which led to today’s risk management approaches that lead to the period of 
‘bunkerisation’.73  This posture was not only consolidated by the twin suicide bombings 
in 2008 in Somaliland, but also the framing of Somaliland within Somalia.  These 
approaches have fed the perception of insecurity for the international actors especially 
the UN and donors and resulted to the adaption of remote management programming.  
 This is where the international community, be they of a political, humanitarian 
or developmental nature, are governed from the comfortable distance provided by 
operational bases. Programmes are ‘remotely managed’ and the staff have only limited 
opportunities to make short field site visits thus transferring increased programming 
responsibilities to local staff or local NGOs.74 For example, the coordination by the UN 
for the Mine Action programme was implemented by the Somaliland Mine Action 
Centre (SMAC) and whilst arrangements for training for the local team were agreed, 
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this was never followed by the UN Technical Advisors as they were unable to spend 
any significant time in Somaliland.  Their responsibilities also extended to the whole of 
Somalia and therefore their priority at the time was activities in South Central 
Somalia.75  The SMAC team therefore lacked adequate technical support for a long time 
due to what was described in an evaluation report as a highly ineffective ‘virtual 
management’ i.e. management by proxy support from UNDP.76   
 Reduction in access, information and a limited capacity for local analysis 
increased the operational risks regarding effectiveness, cost efficiency and 
accountability and produced an acute “field versus headquarters” tension and frustration 
within SMAC senior officials.77 Whilst it was acknowledged that good institutional 
structure existed for mine action on paper, the reality was different.78 The programme 
lacked coherence and was rather a grouping of discrete, but worthwhile activities 
programmes.79  Remote management implied the high administrative costs with claims 
that the total aid allocated to projects never leaves Nairobi.80 This has lead to calls for 
the transfer of decentralization of decisions to Hargeisa, considering the stability of 
Somaliland.81 
 Whilst some organisations have slowly started to increase their presence on the 
ground, engagement still remains through national partners whilst maintaining 
headquarters in Nairobi with implications.   Over two decades later, mine clearance 
programmes are ongoing and whilst there is no strong evidence to suggest that the 
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reason for this delay is limited to the remote management of the programme, the impact 
of the same cannot be completely overlooked.  The most crucial period within the mine 
action programme cycle involving multiple agencies was marred by inefficiency and far 
reaching negative impact on the Sector and mine action in Somaliland in general. As of 
the time of this research, SMAC still had its budgetary allocations under the mandate of 
the UN and had limited choices for funding as they cannot lobby the donors directly.82 
Similarly, this lack of capacity is used by the mine action sector to justify a longer-term 
role with the continued presence of international actors.  
Local ownership and legitimacy 
As one of the key principles of peacebuilding, the strategies, approaches and 
interventions should be drawn from the local needs of the people, using resources and 
capacities that empower them to implement these strategies. With this notion, 
international donors and other players explicitly search for a greater degree of 
legitimacy and sustainability in their interventions. However, as Chesterman argues that 
local ownership is often used “disingenuously - either to mask the assertion of 
potentially dictatorial powers by international actors or to carry a psychological rather 
than political meaning in the area of reconstruction”.83   
Whilst local organisations may claim to be closer to the people through 
participatory approaches, a “clientelistic and exclusive” relationship still exists with the 
external actors that they implement programs for, and hence local actors only serve as 
implementers for external actors usually in pursuit of external objectives under a guise 
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of ‘local ownership’.84  This edifies a well-founded concern and critique that local 
ownership just serves to “cover up a ‘business as usual’ approach”  .85  A study by 
Progressio established that whilst some organisations perpetuated a discourse that 
strategic plans were based on a bottom-up approach that considered local needs, the 
reality and the view of some of the organisations was that they were driven by donors. 
The report highlighted the fact that most local organisations had been formed after the 
war as a response to the international community's need for interlocutors and thus were 
a product of the international organisations. Whilst acknowledging that donors' agendas 
influenced international development stakeholders, including local those of local, 
INGOs and even UN agencies, local organisations were fully dependant and therefore 
had very minimal chances of diversifying their sources of income.86 Thus, whilst not all 
these stakeholders are totally dependent on international aid flows, there are many 
organisations and therefore competition for funding leaving them with little time to 
engage with the grass roots thus their connections with local communities are weak.  
Thus, raising the questions on the extent to which those participatory methods used to 
develop organisational strategies and plans were locally owned and representative of the 
needs of local communities’ "Civil society doesn't have the opportunity to have its own 
priorities" the report concludes.87 Thus, even at the grassroots level, legitimacy for 
‘local ownership’ over the strategic direction for activities is challenged and thus seen 
as insufficient.  When there is failure to secure the elements of local ownership 
sustainability remains elusive for an effective peacebuilding agenda88  and this is 
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articulated in the cynicism of the local people.  For example, according to a leading 
professor and political activist, international organisations do not build capacity and 
hence ownership due to this mode of implementation.  He observed that many of the 
organisations justified building local capacity through organising seminars and 
conferences (never training) and therefore have very limited impact or none at all.89 A  
similar observation was made by Tiilikainen & Mohamed who reported that activities 
run by international NGOs were invisible and local people just saw seminars organized 
at expensive hotels whilst local NGOs remained inefficient and lacking capacity and 
resources.90  
In Conclusion I argue that the peacebuilding agenda has thus reverted to being 
primarily top-down in its approach, and mainly has reflected the perceived needs as 
identified by the external actors rather than the reality of affected people, an observation 
that echoes the views of articulated by the governments assessment of aid previously 
cited.   
I would argue that whilst the formative statebuilding process coincided 
immediate post conflict period, the context was easier to define; a dire need for relief 
aid, and therefore at the time, the external actors aligned themselves to respond to these 
needs.  However, the period post statebuilding is shrouded by the political non-
recognition limbo which challenges the role of external actors.  It also means that their 
programmes oscillate between the provision of relief and humanitarian aid, versus 
responding to the developmental needs that Somaliland now requires.  This is reflected 
in this quote by one government official ‘I think in the first years the needs were so 
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obvious, there was no ambiguity about it but now there is because the needs are not so 
urgent for most people. Somaliland is ‘seen’ as being economically and politically 
stable. The need, for those who can see it, is basically building institutions, building 
strong service delivery base, strengthening governance and of course economic 
development through employment. In the beginning it was community led while in the 
last 10yrs it is more donor- driven.’91 
Conclusion 
Somaliland should give critical peacebuilding scholars an ideal setting to engage 
with a context specific analysis that transcends beyond the state.  However, this has so 
far not been forthcoming.  I argue that this is for several reasons; a ‘state centric’ 
approach to post conflict peacebuilding rooted in the initial call that saw its birth on the 
‘Agenda for Peace’ and therefore an emergent of an academic discipline that followed 
the same trajectory. The process became self-perpetuating and therefore the emerging 
critique. The limited academic enquiry on Somaliland beyond the state reflects how 
liberal peace building critics reproduce their own critiques in their approach to contexts.  
It further illuminates that mainstream academic discourses mirror or follow donor 
funding priorities.   
Thus, due to the absence of a critical engagement on other interventions on 
Somaliland, the dominant narrative that persisted is that of the absence of external 
actors who are at the heart of the liberal peacebuilding critiques.  This I theorise masks 
other externally led interventions which continued to thrive which further highlights the 
state centric nature of the critiques.   
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Emerging evidence92  further suggests that indeed external actors now permeate 
the state building arena where the donors continually ‘challenges the government to 
adopt donor-led rigid templates and conditionality on electoral schedules and 
benchmarks at the risk of delegitimising the ‘hybrid’ polity, undermining and deforming 
the locally-owned, emancipatory democratisation process’.93  
  Through a context analysis of Somaliland, I demonstrate the way in which 
these external actors have engaged and consolidated their role in Somaliland 
entrenching the prevailing critiques of liberal peacebuilding; where the key actors are 
mainly western donors and international NGOs; programmes are poorly coordinated, 
and that those intervening in Somaliland have to a large extent not only failed in 
building local ownership but have also failed to establish sustainability which not only 
leads to ineffective liberal peacebuilding programme but can also lead to failure.94   
Whilst these approaches exacerbate both vertical and horizontal inequalities in 
Somaliland95, relative peace prevails in Somaliland. Thus, the interventions cannot be 
deemed as having failed completely as peace and security prevails, thus I argue that by 
engaging in context specific analysis, the Somaliland provides a nuanced critique that 
illuminates the way in which different factors coalesce to produce the prevailing 
critiques; at the centre of which is a response to political non-recognition.   
                                                 
92 Verjee, "The Economics of Elections in Somaliland: The Financing of Political Parties and Candidates."; Bradbury, Becoming 
Somaliland. 
93 Yoshito Nakagawa, "Deliberative Peacebuilding in East Timor and Somaliland" (University of Manchester, 2016). Pg. 242  
94 Richmond, "Emanipatory Forms of Human Security and Liberal Peacebuilding."; Chandler, "Peacebuilding and the Politics of 
Non-Linearity: Rethinking ‘Hidden’ Agency and ‘Resistance’."; Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting 
the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations; Suhrke, Peacebuilding: Lessons for Afghanistan. 
95 Hammond et al., "Cash and Compassion: The Role of the Somali Diaspora in Relief, Development and Peace-Building."; Phillips, 
"Political Settlements and State Formation - the Case of Somaliland. ". 
